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Abstract 
 
The Manchester Chamber of Commerce established a Testing House in 1895 and 
introduced uniform yarn contracting rules in 1897. The Chamber made these institutional 
‘innovations’ to deal with the nefarious practice of ‘short-reeling’. Our case study explains 
how and why merchants were crucial to overcoming weaknesses in domestic – and to 
some extent - foreign legislation, to overcome this fraudulent activity.  We argue that the 
Testing House and uniform contract were tantamount to developing a quasi-legal system 
such that private standards established through cooperative agreements had legal sanction. 
Our study shows how institutions evolved to improve governance along the supply chain 
for this highly specialised export-orientated industry. We contribute to the growing 
literature on historical markets, institutions and standards: based on extensive archival 
sources, we show how specific and complementary commercial institutions developed 
within grounded notions of governance rather than abstracted spaces of market exchange.  
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‘Spinning a yarn’: Institutions, Law, and 
Standards c1880-1914. 
 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the global production and trade in 
cotton-textiles was dominated by Lancashire. It was ‘the leading industry of its day’.1  The 
data supporting this claim are convincing: by 1913 the UK owned approximately 40.0 and 
30.0 per cent, respectively, of the world’s spindles and power looms.2 Between 1910 and 
1913, the UK accounted for 70 per cent of world trade in cotton textiles. To place the latter 
figure into context, the UK’s share of world trade in these products exceeded those of 
Europe, the US, and India, by a factor of 3.5, 16.6, and 74, respectively.3 
 High levels of vertical and horizontal specialisation were a defining characteristic 
of the industry. Before the mid-nineteenth century, vertically-integrated spinning and 
weaving firms predominated.4  But, by 1911, 77 per cent of spinning capacity and 65 per 
cent of weaving capacity was controlled by specialist spinning and specialist weaving 
firms, respectively.5 Within each of the principal stages of cotton-textile production there 
existed a plethora of firms. In total, approximately 2,000 firms were engaged in spinning 
and weaving in the years immediately preceding the first world war.  Competition within 
the industry as a whole was vividly described by Barnard and Hugh Ellinger as being, 
‘without cohesion, without nucleus, loose, higgledy-piggledy, rushing hither and thither, 
jostling, chasing, fighting’.6 The separation of spinning and weaving was complemented 
by geographic concentration.  In broad terms, spinning and weaving were highly 
concentrated in the South and South West, and North and North East of Lancashire, 
respectively.7  
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, much of the historiography on the Lancashire cotton-
textile industry has focused on the relationship between structure and performance. 
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Particular attention has been devoted to whether the industry’s structure impeded 
technological choice and productivity. This has also been the subject of Anglo-American 
comparisons, particularly the role of labour relations on productivity and employment 
practices and the extent to which differences in firm structure (specialised or vertically 
integrated) affected financial performance.8  
In contrast, the role of merchants has been comparatively neglected; no clear 
consensus has emerged about the impact of these agents on the Lancashire cotton-textile 
industry.  Steven Broadberry and Andrew Marrison, for example, have argued that 
merchants, ‘played a key part’ in the creation of external economies which underpinned 
the industry.9 Their econometric analysis quantified the views of contemporaries, such as 
Elijah Helm, for whom, ‘there [was] no mercantile organisation in the world which [was] 
so capable of widespread, efficient, and economical distribution’.10 Other commentators 
have been less favourable in their assessment of merchants. One report stated that 
merchants had, ‘made mass production of any particular line almost impossible’, and that, 
‘the interests of the merchants are often different from those of the manufacturers, for it 
may pay the former to push foreign goods at the expense of the latter’. 11 
The purpose of this article is to re-assess the contribution of merchants to the 
international dominance of the Lancashire industry. Unlike the previous studies detailed 
above, our examination focuses on two institutional developments – the establishment of 
a Testing House (1895) and the introduction of a uniform contract (1897) – in which 
textile merchants belonging to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce (MCC), played a 
pivotal role. We argue that such institutional innovations are examples of ways in which 
the merchants sought solutions to endemic contractual problems that confronted the 
industry in the late nineteenth century. Our focus is on the nefarious practice of ‘short-
 5 
reeling’ of cotton yarn whereby yarn counts were deliberately and systematically 
misrepresented.12 This practice undermined the genuine yarn trade and, consequently, the 
cloth trade, which the Lancashire merchants dominated internationally. To improve 
governance they introduced the two institutional solutions, which were tantamount to 
developing a quasi-legal system: private standards established through cooperative 
agreements, which were legally enforceable. Such institutions are unusual for 
manufactures, being more characteristic of organized commodity markets.13 
 The role of merchants in the standardization of quality and setting rules of 
contractual exchange has been recognized in the broader historical literature. Simon Ville 
has argued that merchants, through associations, provide strong structural and cultural 
properties to markets, thereby strengthening them. 14  Stephen Pirrong showed how 
merchants, via commodity exchanges, governed contractual relations through commodity 
measurements, standardization and contract enforcement.15 Similarly Kenneth Lipartito 
demonstrated how an efficient market for cotton depended upon rules enforced through 
the New York Cotton Exchange that involved, inter alia, stamping out the circulation of 
false and unreliable information to reduce information asymmetry.16 Other disciplines 
have similarly situated the role of merchants in regulating international trade in 
commodities, standardizing product quality, developing and enforcing contracts, and 
generally improving governance where exchange occurs between ‘actors in a value chain 
having only partial knowledge of the product and its related production methods’.17 In 
other words, the agency for developing contract rules often lies with the intermediaries 
rather than the producers or end-buyers in a commodity chain: in our case,  Manchester 
merchants developed the rules for the sale of yarn.18 
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The relationship between contracts and exchange is fundamental to the operation 
of markets.  According to Alessandro Stanziani, a mainspring for the evolution of 
capitalist economies was the tension between national institutions, global dynamics and 
local products.19 For example: how to determine a market price that ensures accurate 
correspondence between price and quality? One response was to define the quality 
characteristics of a product. But this solution was not always successful because market 
participants might not share the same perspective on the price-quality nexus and, in any 
case, there may exist several definitions of ‘quality’.20 The chambers of commerce (and 
other certifying bodies) resolved this conflict by developing benchmark standards. This, 
in turn, facilitated product standardization - the characteristics of the product do not vary 
through time. Other benefits that ensued from standards-certification included a reduction 
in the costs of negotiation and inspection and a reduction in uncertainty. Stanziani’s 
analysis focused on commodities, such as alcohol, cooking-oil, oats, rye and wheat and 
he concluded that detailed product-quality definitions were not necessary in other markets. 
Although the establishment of certifying bodies was more characteristic of market trade 
in primary products, the evidence presented in this article shows that quality-certification 
was practised in cotton textiles.  
In the same vein, this article complements and extends historical analysis of 
governance in the supply-chain. A substantial literature has documented the quality-
control issues that can arise when producers are ‘separated’ from distributors and 
merchants. Alcoholic beverages have featured prominently in these analyses. In the wine 
trade, James Simpson has demonstrated that merchants helped undermine the repute of 
famous Chateau, such as Lafite and Marguax, by selling ‘inferior’ wines from earlier 
vintages; they also opposed implementation of Appellation d’Origine regulations which 
restricted their ability to blend wine from different regions and to market the composite 
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product as ‘Bordeaux’. Wine growers unsuccessfully attempted to wrestle back control 
from merchants and by the early twentieth century, most commodity chains in the French 
wine trade failed to provide ‘accurate information that would enable consumers to 
discriminate between differences in quality’.21 Similarly, Paul Duguid, has examined the 
advertising campaigns of merchants representing growers in the Douro and Porto regions 
which had the effect of ceding more authority to earlier points in the supply chain – and 
subordinating merchants’ names.22   
In contrast to the above studies, merchants in the Lancashire textile industry 
remained of paramount importance during the industry’s rapid growth before 1914. Few 
manufacturers marketed their products under their own brands. One estimate indicates 
that by the early 1920s, there existed no more than eight publicly quoted companies and 
eighteen private companies which had developed their own marketing activities.23 Many 
of these, for example, Sir Elkanah Armitage, Barlow & Jones, Ashton Brothers, 
Horrockses Crewdson & Co., and Tootal Broadhurst & Lee, were established in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nonetheless, even for these companies, and other 
famous integrated concerns such as John Rylands & Sons, ‘the Latin American market for 
textiles was still controlled by merchants’.24 Consequently, merchants’ trademarks and 
brands prevailed in the sale of cotton-textiles. Indeed, some of the biggest merchants in 
this industry owned substantial numbers of trademarks: Ralli Brothers, owned 3,000 
marks; William Graham & Co., and G & R Dewhurst owned over 1,000 marks each. Many 
other merchants owned in excess of 500 marks.25 The dominance of merchants’ brands 
meant they could not be insensible to the quality of yarn and cloth supplied in the 
‘upstream’ stages of production: failure to supply products which met expected quality 
would have damaged their own reputation, not those of the manufacturers. For Stanley 
Chapman, ‘Competition among spinners and weavers guaranteed cheapness, while the 
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merchants’ insistence on perfection and exact adaption to particular consumers’ wants 
was a guarantee of quality’.26 We argue that merchants, operating through the MCC, 
effected standardisation of products via the introduction of a uniform contract, which 
defined appropriate trade descriptions. This initiative was supported by the establishment 
of a Testing House, the decisions of which were accepted as a means to settle trade 
disputes without recourse to the courts. We recognise that the growth of specialist 
merchants facilitated vertical specialisation within the industry. But, in contradistinction 
to previous analyses of these agents, we argue that their role in developing better 
governance within the supply chain has not received the attention it warrants.  
We contend that deconstructing how institutions counteract the pernicious effects 
of competition is crucial to improving our understanding of the governance of market-
based exchanges. Institutions do matter but, so too,  do the complementarities between 
different institutions – public and private. 27  We show how civic actors (merchants) 
established private institutions when state regulation proved inadequate for market 
governance. Our research also contributes to the understanding of different forms of 
market governance, especially those that operate at the boundary of state and civil 
society. 28  Under certain conditions, such as those we study, competition without 
cooperation may prove inadequate to foster stronger governance. Nevertheless, 
cooperation could be unequal and does not imply consensus, just as standardisation is 
often fraught with politics, negotiation and compromise.29 The lesson from this case study 
should be that competitive- or market-based exchange does not by itself imply robust 
governance. Market exchanges are based on rules, but how these rules emerge is still 
largely unclear.30 
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 This article is based on a detailed examination of archival sources of key industry 
associations, including the MCC, the Master Cotton Spinners Associations and various 
parliamentary reports and other official publications. It is organised as follows. Section 
two briefly explains the importance of merchants in the Lancashire cotton- textile industry 
and the functioning of the MCC, which was the principle institution through which 
merchants aired their grievances. It further outlines the problems generated by ‘false 
measurements’ that the merchants experienced. Section three examines the legislative 
landscape and why Manchester merchants considered it inadequate to resolve the issues 
of product quality. Section four details the historical context in which uniform contracting 
and the centralized testing for quality emerged through merchant intervention. Section 
five examines the legacy of this intervention and section six concludes.  
MERCHANTS IN THE LANCASHIRE COTTON-TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
It is well established that the Lancashire cotton textile industry benefitted from rapidly 
expanding export markets for most of the nineteenth century and up to 1914.31 Table 1 
shows the broad patterns of export trade during this period, from which the following 
trends are apparent. First, yarn exports were substantial throughout our period. Second, 
yarn as a percentage of total cotton textile exports declined from the 1890s - continuing a 
trend that began in the 1870s.32 There is no doubt that India was, by far, Lancashire’s 
biggest export market in the late-nineteenth century, accounting, on average, for almost 
40 per cent of cloth exports (by volume) between 1880 and 1913. The comparable figures 
for Latin America and the Far East (China and Hong Kong) were eight, and ten per cent, 
respectively. In contrast, Lancashire exported more yarn to continental Europe compared 
to India.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
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 The production and marketing of yarn and cloth were coordinated by a multitude 
of specialist merchants at each stage of production. In the early stages of the industry’s 
development, spinners and manufacturers employed their own agents to sell their 
products.  Wright Armitage, a Manchester-based manufacturer, used family members to 
sell its cloth in the US; McConnell & Kennedy, one of the most famous Manchester 
spinners, corresponded with business partners in Egypt, India and Poland. Some 
merchants, such as Gregs, successfully became millowners by the late-eighteenth 
century. 33  However, from the early-mid nineteenth century yarn spinners and 
manufacturers began to rely on specialist merchants for distribution, merchanting and 
retailing. 34  Estimates indicate that there were approximately 1,000 merchants in the 
industry between 1911 and 1931.35 This number conceals considerable specialisation 
amongst this group. Yarn agents acted as intermediaries between spinners and 
manufacturers; it appears that they purchased approximately 50 per cent of the yarn sold 
on the Manchester Royal Exchange.36 Merchants were responsible for converting cloth 
into the final product to suit the requirements of their particular customers. Converting 
involved bleaching, dyeing and printing and the processing of cloth into specific garments 
(handkerchiefs, household-linen, shirts, under-clothing). Most merchants were engaged 
in the export trade, but a few, such as J & N. Phillips, I & J Cooper and S & J Watts, 
specialised in the home trade. 37  In addition, merchants also played a crucial role in 
disseminating market information: ‘The industry looks to [merchants] to maintain contact 
with markets…to push the sales of its products in these markets and to bring back 
knowledge of what the consumer needs’.38  
 Foreign merchants featured prominently in the Lancashire textile trade. One of the 
most famous (and biggest) firms – Ralli Brothers – was established in Manchester by 
1828; by 1865, through a series of interlocking partnerships, they were operating in 15 
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centres across Europe, India, and the Middle East.39 Subsequently, Rallis’ were joined by 
other Greek houses: Rodocanachi, Sons & Co., Rocca Brothers, Cassavetti Brothers & 
Co. It was stated of the Cababé Brothers, who began in Manchester in 1840, that they had 
almost a monopoly in the trade with Syria. The number of Greek merchants based in 
Manchester grew rapidly and by 1870 they exceeded the number of German houses. 
According to Stanley Chapman, the principal reasons for the success of Greek merchants 
was, ‘that they succeeded in finding new markets for cotton piece goods in a part of the 
world where British representation was weak’.40 In addition, Greek merchants acted as a 
conduit for other merchants operating in particular ports, such as Beirut and they 
developed reciprocal trading relationships between Britain and the Middle East. By the 
mid-nineteenth century, Ralli Brothers were establishing a ‘massive mercantile operation’ 
in India, and they, together with another leading Greek merchant house – Spartali & 
Lascardi, were probably the biggest merchants operating in the UK – surpassed only by 
the Rothschilds.41 However, for other export markets, such as Latin America, it appears 
that British merchants, such as Hugo Dallas, were prominent.42 There were about 150 
middle-eastern merchant houses based in Manchester by the end of the nineteenth-
century, further consolidating  Lancashire’s links with this region.43 
 The MCC was the principal institution which represented cotton-textile merchants. 
It began as a Commercial Society, founded in 1794, and its stated objectives included 
efforts ‘to resist and prevent…the depredations committed on mercantile property in 
foreign parts, detect swindlers, expose chicanes and persons void of principle and honour 
in their dealings’.44 In 1820, the Commercial Society was reconstituted as the MCC. 
Merchants engaged in the Lancashire cotton textile trade were the single most important 
group belonging to the MCC. Members engaged in the Lancashire cotton industry (in any 
capacity) accounted for 73 per cent and 61 per cent of total membership in 1860 and 1900, 
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respectively. Within this textile cohort, members who were merchants only,  comprised 
45 and 48 per cent respectively of the ‘textile’ membership, and 33 and 29 per cent, 
respectively, of the Chamber’s total membership in these years.45 Given the importance 
of textile interests within the MCC, and especially the prominence of merchants, it is 
unsurprising that, in common with other Chambers, the MCC lobbied actively on behalf 
of its members when common interests were threatened. For example, Sven Beckert has 
demonstrated that this chamber was involved in efforts to reduce tariffs; it opposed the 
emigration of artisans and it played a key role in the agitation to secure Indian cotton 
during the American Civil War.46 Beckert emphasises that merchants were acutely aware 
of the need for a sound legal infrastructure – backed by the state – to safeguard their 
activities: 
Trade ultimately depended on a legal infrastructure devised and 
enforced by states.  Unsurprisingly, merchants spent much of their 
political energy on trying to strengthen this legal order and make it 
conform to their interests…Conventions, although agreed upon by 
merchants themselves, needed enforceable rules, and merchants 
understood that no single actor was as efficient in enforcing those 
rules as the state.47 
We argue that this statement is only partly correct. The British government enacted the 
Merchandise Marks Acts in an attempt to eradicate, or at least minimise, fraudulent 
activity across various industrial sectors. But, as we demonstrate below, the MCC 
perceived weaknesses in this legislation; the Chamber was particularly aggrieved that 
these Acts  only applied to falsely marked yarn: they  did not specify that yarn had to be 
spun to a uniform length when sold in the open market. This subtle distinction created a 
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serious lacuna for ‘genuine trading.’ As far as the merchants were concerned, the legal 
infrastructure only partially addressed their concerns. A fundamental impasse existed 
between trade understanding of yarn and cloth measurements and those specified in the 
Merchandise Marks Acts. For the same reason, also discussed later, attempts by the MCC 
to ensure alignment between Indian and British legislation was only partially successful. 
We explain this issue in more detail in the context of the trade problems generated by false 
lengths.  
Cotton yarn was sold by weight, but the ‘count’ denoted its fineness or quality. A 
count indicated the number of hanks - each of 840 yards - of  yarn needed to make a weight 
of one pound. Thus, a count of 100s meant that 100 hanks (totalling 84,000 yards) made 
up one pound. Higher counts indicated lighter, finer and more expensive yarn, whereas 
lower counts were heavier, coarser and cheaper. 48  ‘Short-reeling’ exploited this 
relationship. For example, a contract for 100s might be specified but the yarn delivered 
was in hanks of only 820 yards (totalling 82,000 yards). To make good the deficiency in 
weight, coarser (heavier) yarn was actually supplied. In other words, the weight of yarn 
delivered was correct, but not its composition. Other instances of misrepresenting the true 
count included increasing the thickness of cardboard backing when transporting the yarn 
to make up the weight deficiency. Manchester firms were clearly identified as the 
principal culprits: ‘goods which were marked 100 yards did not measure 50; those marked 
150 yards only measured 70 or 80’.49  Short-reeling was not unique to the Lancashire 
industry, but its prevalence was greater and more persistent compared to other UK textile 
regions. In Yorkshire, the formation of an ‘association for suppressing the practice of false 
marking or labelling of goods for sale’ by the Huddersfield Chamber of Commerce 
effectively led to the disappearance of the practice of short-reeling from the woollen 
industry.50 The Leeds Chamber of Commerce also supported the eradication of stamping 
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false lengths.51  Nevertheless, short reeling was potentially far more damaging to the 
Lancashire cotton textile industry because of the sheer volume of its exports. Over the 
period 1890-1913, exports of cotton cloth and yarn exceeded those composed of wool, by 
a factor of 32 and 4,300, respectively; over the same period, exports of cotton yarn 
exceeded those of thread by a factor of 8.5.52 
Contemporaries claimed that the industry’s structure provided an incentive to 
‘short-reeling’; that specialised spinners deliberately short-reeled the yarn knowingly 
purchased by merchants.53 The financial rewards generated from slight discrepancies 
between reported and actual counts were enormous. James Lees, managing director of 
Crompton & Co., and Wood End Mills, reported that his mills produced 80,000 pounds 
weight of 12s every week, and to mark these as 14s would yield £2,000 per annum profit 
if the price difference between these counts was just half a farthing.54 Merchants were not 
without blame either. Some instructed bleaching companies ‘to make-up and mark the 
lengths of white piece goods in ways which are at least of doubtful legality’.55 
The insidious effects of short-reeling within Manchester were exacerbated by 
similar practices abroad. The MCC complained about Austro-Hungarian firms selling 
short-reeled yarn in Continental Europe. The Chamber vociferously objected to Austrian 
short-reeled yarn exported to Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Turkey, and urged the Foreign 
Office to encourage these countries to introduce appropriate legislation.56 Complaints 
regarding short reeling in international markets emerged in the 1880s and reached a 
crescendo in the following decade.57 Merchants complained that short-reeling by foreign 
spinners, ‘acted to the detriment of full reeled English spun yarn’; that such practices, 
‘defraud the buyer and consumer, to the great disadvantage of all honest traders’. By 1892, 
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the Chamber was demanding ‘an international agreement [and] legislation to [end] 
fraudulent trading induced by improper competition’.58   
Contemporaneous with short-reeling was the practice of falsely stamping piece 
goods. A dedicated committee, comprising representatives of prominent merchants and 
manufacturers such as G & R Dewhurst, Ralli Brothers, and Tootal Broadhurst & Lee,   
was established in 1886 to investigate, ‘the frequent complaints arising, principally in 
India, of the false marking of piece goods [exported] to that country from Lancashire’. To 
ensure a higher standard of commercial morality within Manchester, the committee 
recommended that: all cotton piece goods exported to India had to be plainly marked with 
the length of each piece in imperial yards; the average length of the pieces of any lot had 
to conform with the indicated length; each piece could deviate from the indicated length 
by only a small discrepancy equivalent to 0.7 per cent.59 The MCC also instructed customs 
officials in Calcutta and the Bengal Chamber of Commerce about the ‘proper methods to 
be observed in determining the widths of cotton piece goods, when such widths are 
stamped upon the ‘face-plait’ of the goods.’60 The Chamber took a dim view of traders 
who employed ‘false folding’ methods for cloth sold in Egypt and Nigeria, making the 
cloth appear longer than it actually was.61 
By the late-nineteenth century, Lancashire merchants became increasingly 
concerned about the marketability of their textiles in foreign markets. Issues surrounding 
product quality featured prominently. ‘Quality’ in this context was distinct from ‘bad 
spinning.’ 62  For the merchants, maintaining quality meant standardisation and 
measurement uniformity of yarn and piece-goods in terms of counts or lengths. By 
controlling quality in this manner, merchants sought to strengthen governance within the 
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textile industry. Their actions must be situated within the scope and limitations of existing 
state regulation at the time. 
 
MERCHANDISE MARKS LEGISLATION IN THE UK AND ABROAD  
Short-reeling was viewed as part of a more general problem of accurate ‘labelling 
and marking’ of merchandise, rather than a weights and measures issue of ‘false 
measurement’. The Merchandise Marks Act 1862 introduced legislation criminalising 
false indications of quantity.63  However, in the Lancashire industry, no prosecutions 
involving short reeling were effected before 1888 because there was no universal custom 
for marking yarn or cloth: marks might refer to either quantity or quality as noted above. 
In addition, the Act required proof of intent to defraud – a difficult task if spinners 
indicated that the yarn supplied did not contain hanks of 840 yards.64  The effect of 
moisture on yarn was recognised as problematic. It was estimated that the amount of 
moisture contained in yarn in the spinning room varied from 3.5 to 7.5 per cent. Stocks of 
yarn containing a high level of moisture would be affected by mildew, especially if they 
were exported to warmer climates. If very damp yarn was reeled in the full glare of the 
sun and then weighed, a totally erroneous indication of count was generated. Moreover, 
inherent variation in length during spinning meant that the reported ‘count’ was not exact 
and this variation depended on the counts spun.  For bleached yarns, the variation could 
be 8.5 per cent. 65  Given these difficulties, the problem of marking short-lengths 
persisted.66  
 To a large extent, the Merchandise Marks Act of 1887 remedied many of 
the weaknesses in the 1862 Act. The 1887 Act stipulated that persons who applied a false 
trade description to products, ‘unless he proves that he acted without intent to defraud’, 
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was guilty of an offence and could be imprisoned for up to two years (with hard labour) 
or fined £20.67 A Select Committee appointed to review the workings of the former Act 
reported on its benefits.68 However, as far as the Lancashire cotton-textile industry was 
concerned, major deficiencies remained. The President of the MCC, George Lord, 
testified to collusion on short-lengths involving Lancashire spinners, Manchester 
merchants and Indian dealers. In Lord’s opinion, collusion meant it was impossible to 
obtain sufficient evidence to instigate a successful prosecution under the 1887 Act.69    
Dissatisfied with the 1887 Act, the MCC established its own investigation in 1888, 
which revealed that the practice of marking ‘short-length’ was particularly acute in 
‘bundle yarns’. 70  This inquiry revealed further problems in the application of the 
Merchandise Marks Act, 1887. Much depended on how the Courts interpreted this Act; 
without clarity it was impossible for the merchants to establish how this Act affected 
existing practices in Lancashire.71 Because the Merchandise Marks Acts were criminal 
statutes there was no opportunity to ‘test the water’ by instigating a ‘friendly’ civil test 
case.72 The MCC was concerned that although the standard practice in Lancashire was to 
reel hanks of 840 yards, the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, ‘does not limit spinners to this 
mode of reeling, but allows them full liberty to reel and tie up in any way which is not 
calculated to deceive’.73 In the absence of deception, the 1887 Act prevented Manchester 
merchants from instigating legal action even when hanks contained less than 840 yards. 
Short-reeling was first introduced to deceive customers but had, ‘become so general that 
the practice had ceased to be dishonest’.74 Others claimed that the practice was especially 
damaging to the reputation of Manchester’s cotton merchants because it represented a 
double fraud in terms of quantity and quality.75 
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Two high-profile cases on short reeling indicated the scale of fraud practiced by 
certain unscrupulous spinners and merchants after the 1887 Act. In 1888, M/s. Pemberton, 
a Lancashire-based spinner, charged Greenhalgh & Sons with falsely supplying 60s yarn 
in hanks of 570 yards, the total fraud in the transaction amounting to 81,000 yards. The 
plaintiffs referred to the Select Committee evidence (discussed above): if a spinner could 
make an extra £2000 per annum by selling 12s as 14s, just imagine the profits to be earned 
by selling yarn in hanks of 570, instead of 840 yards. The defendants were also accused 
of supplying the Manchester merchant Messrs G. and A. Ananiadi with the spurious yarn; 
the latter were able to sell this yarn at a price which was below the production costs of 
genuine 60s – thereby threatening to destroy the genuine trade in this yarn. M/s. 
Pemberton stated that, ‘They wanted a conviction, and they wanted to put an end to those 
dishonest practices. If the case was given the publicity which he anticipated it would have, 
because it was a case which was watched with the greatest interest by the mercantile 
societies in Manchester…and wherever cotton spinning was carried on, it would achieve 
that end’. The defendant was found guilty, fined £4, ordered to pay £120 in costs and 
required to furnish information, which would allow an action to be brought against 
Ananiadi.76 Subsequently, in 1889, Ananiadi was convicted of causing bundles of yarn 
containing 45 hanks to the pound (weight) to be made-up as 60 hanks and marking these 
bundles with ‘60’ to indicate the count of yarn contained in the bundle. According to 
Lewis Boyd Sebastian, a prominent British authority on merchandise marks, these 
practices represented a double fraud: ‘the yarn was made to appear to be of a finer quality 
than it really was, and the hank, instead of containing its normal number of yards, viz., 
840, contained only about 630 yards, and was, in fact, a spurious hank. Consequently, 
there was a misrepresentation both as to the length and the fineness of the yarn’.77   
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Despite such convictions, the MCC remained sceptical of the Merchandise Marks 
Act. Convictions were secured in the above cases precisely because the yarn was falsely 
described. The MCC was adamant that selling hanks of yarn which were less than 840 
yards was wrong per se, not just when they were falsely described: merchants were not 
satisfied merely by punishing false descriptions. They sought to standardise the hank of 
840 yards throughout the industry and to punish anyone who provided hanks less than 
from this standard, even if they were accurately and legally described. In 1891, the MCC 
appointed a special committee to investigate whether current modes of reeling and the 
making-up single of yarns conflicted with the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887. This 
committee examined a sample of ‘short-reeled’ yarn and found it to be ‘calculated to 
materially deceive the spinning trade of this country’. But more evidence was required for 
a criminal prosecution. Letters from merchants stated, ‘that it was well known and capable 
of proof that large quantities of yarn are being reeled in short lengths of 600 to 700 yards 
per hank for shipment to the continent to the injury of legitimate trade.’78 The law still 
remained unclear about the standard for establishing short-reeling, and it required an 
expensive legal process and sympathetic courts to establish that deliberate fraud had 
occurred when hanks did not contain 840 yards. In 1892, in an attempt to prevent 
intentional departures from 840 yards, the MCC issued a statement:  a hank of 840 yards 
of single cotton yarn was a recognised trade description; deviations from 840 yards were 
in breach of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887.79  
However, the views of the MCC conflicted with the Merchandise Marks Act, 
1887, and, as we show later, it became imperative that the Chamber sought an industry-
wide agreement that a hank was, in fact, 840 yards. Section 18 of the Merchandise Marks 
Act, 1887, stated: ‘Where, at the passing of this Act, a trade description is lawfully and 
generally applied to goods…the provisions of this Act with respect to false trade 
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descriptions shall not apply’. In other words, it was lawful to supply hanks of less than 
840 yards provided this was indicated. But the dilemma posed by this practice was that it 
prevented a consensus being reached on what constituted a ‘standard hank’ and it had the 
potential to undermine the competitiveness of firms, which only supplied hanks of 840 
yards.  
In any case, as a purely domestic statute, the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, was 
incapable of preventing short-reeling in Austro-Hungary or, indeed, anywhere outside 
Britain. This created a tenuous position as far as Manchester merchants were concerned. 
No gain could be achieved if misrepresentation was eradicated in Lancashire, but 
permitted to continue abroad. The inequity of this situation was forcefully communicated 
by the MCC in a Memorandum to the Foreign Office, in which they indicated: 
The Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, has not been followed by similar 
legislation in competing cotton-spinning countries abroad. [There 
is] loss of business in English yarns through the preference given to 
Austrian spinnings, in consequence of these being ‘short-
reeled’…the disability thus imposed upon English spinners and 
merchants should be represented … with a view to inducing the 
Roumanian Government to prohibit the importation into their 
country of yarns reeled at less standard length than 840 yards to the 
hank.80 
This begs the question: how successful was the MCC in its petitioning of the British 
government to encourage Bulgaria, Roumania, Serbia and Turkey, to enact legislation 
preventing the import of yarns in hanks which were less than 840 yards? This question 
occupied the MCC throughout the early 1890s, but without a solution.81 The Serbian 
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government published a notice in their Official Gazette, but admitted, ‘it was unlikely 
[they] would take any further steps in the matter’82. Government officials in Roumania 
stated they did not, ‘possess any means of preventing the importation into Roumania of 
cotton yarns…not coming up to the length required by English law’, and, ‘the state both 
of the intelligence and education of the Customs officials was too low to permit of the 
proper working of any law which might require the Customs to discriminate between true 
and falsely reeled yarn’. 83  Turkey does not appear to have introduced legislation 
comparable to the British Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, before 1913.84 The petitioning 
of individual foreign governments to prohibit the import of ‘short-reeled’ yarns from 
Austria was the only course of action available to the MCC because there did not exist a 
global framework preventing unfair competition.85  
The MCC was more successful in exerting pressure on the Indian government.86  
Manchester merchants were particularly concerned with misrepresentation of textile 
products exported to India because of the size of the Indian market and because the British 
Merchandise Marks Act of 1887 did not initially apply to India. Exacerbating matters, 
there was no legal standard of ‘yard’ in India.87  The MCC emphasised the need for 
corresponding merchandise mark legislation to be introduced in India because, 
‘satisfactory and effectual means cannot be taken here to put an end to the present system 
of incorrect stamping’,  and petitioned the Indian government accordingly. 88  
Manchester’s campaign coincided with growing dissatisfaction about the ineffectiveness 
of domestic legislation among India’s cotton industrialists. The chairmen of the chambers 
of commerce in Bengal, Bombay and Madras, and the Millowners Association in Bombay, 
expressed their support for an Indian version of the UK Merchandise Marks Act, 1887. 
Indian industrialists recognised that many of the practices they wanted criminalised were 
identical to those practised in Britain before 1887. The chamber of commerce in Karachi 
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stated that it was desirable that an Act be introduced, ‘making the false stamping of lengths 
and the false stamping of quantities punishable’, and a leading editorial stated, ‘the great 
bulk of mercantile opinion in India is in favour of early legislation, and this is certainly 
the view of the mercantile community in Great Britain who are interested in Indian 
trade.’ 89  Without corresponding legislation in India, the MCC recognised that the 
operation of the British Merchandise Marks Act of 1887 would have the unintended 
consequence of encouraging continental European spinners to export textiles with false 
description of length to India – further undermining Lancashire’s competitiveness. 90 
 In 1889, the Indian Merchandise Marks Act was passed.91 Many of its provisions 
were similar to those of the British Act of 1887, for example, the definition of ‘trade 
description’ and ‘false trade description’. The Indian Act made additional provision for 
the identification and testing of trade descriptions featuring prominently in the textile 
trade.92 At least in the early years of its operation, the Indian Act was especially effective 
in the detection of falsely marked textiles imported to India. Comparing 1890-91, with 
1891-92, the total number of seizures by the Indian customs authorities was 1,133 and 
894, of which 59 and 56 per cent, respectively, were under the provisions governing false 
stamping of lengths on textiles.93 Manchester cotton merchants recognised that the Indian 
Merchandise Marks Act, 1889, had been beneficial: it had cured the deceptive marking of 
grey bundle yarn it had eradicated the ambiguous stamping of cloth by requiring every 
piece to be stamped with its actual length.94   
 The Indian Act also provided for ‘limits of variation as regards number, quantity, 
measure, gauge or weight.’ 95  In 1890, the Indian government established a special 
committee to determine this latitude.96  However,  a clear consensus proved difficult to 
reach. The special committee recommended that the variation on grey yarns should be 
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five per cent either way. The Bombay Millowners Association recommended that the 
permissible variation on grey yarns should be 10, 7.5, and 5 per cent, on all yarns under 
16s, 16s to 30s, and greater than 30s, respectively. Recognising that such variation could 
not be applied to all types of yarn, - for example bleached or unbleached -- the committee 
recommended that acceptable variation as regards count and length should be the same as 
grey yarns, but variation in weight would be permissible for dyed yarns. 97  Further 
consultation resulted in the Calcutta Notification which specified that the only acceptable 
trade description applied to dyed yarns was that denoting length in which the hank was 
840 yards, from which only slight variation of 2.5% was permitted.98 In other words, 
because dyeing and bleaching caused unavoidable ‘shrinkage’ in the ‘grey’ yarn, it was 
permissible to stamp the original (pre-processed) count on the treated yarn provided the 
length of a hank was no less than 819 yards.  The MCC fully approved this policy.99 
 However, the treatment of dyed or bleached yarns proved problematic because of 
differences in trade practice between spinners in Manchester and Glasgow. For example 
Stamping ‘60s made up as 40s dyed’ indicated a conflict between the length and weight 
of yarn which was unacceptable under the new Indian legislation. Because dyeing altered 
the count of the yarn originally supplied, which trade description should the authorities 
use when determining whether a trade description was false: the original yarn count prior 
to dyeing or the count after dyeing?100  A fissure developed between Lancashire and 
Glasgow-based exporters, who held opposing views on trade practices, not only about 
short-reeling. According to Manchester merchants the most honest way of denominating 
all dyed yarns, was that they should conform throughout to the original grey counts: 
‘Manchester firms have stipulated for many years that …the counts of coloured yarn…are 
the counts of the yarn in the grey state, and not what the yarn counts in its dyed 
condition.’ 101  The Glasgow firms considered this to be an unworkable proposition, 
 24 
claiming that their existing practice of sending ‘net weight’ yarns to India was in concord 
with the new legislation. They claimed that ‘if an attempt is made to demand a description 
at some former period of [an article’s] existence, which cannot be proved or disproved, 
the door is thereby opened for misrepresentation, deception and fraud.’102 
To find a solution, Manchester merchants and the Scottish Turkey-Red Dyers 
Association met in Carlisle in 1898. The meeting did not arrive at a way of resolving the 
two opposing positions: stating the original grey counts or stamping the ‘new’ count of 
the dyed yarn. It resulted ultimately in the former instigating unsuccessful legal action 
against the latter.103 Despite intervention by the Board of Trade, this matter was never 
satisfactorily resolved before 1914 and Manchester merchants continued to complain 
about the export of short-reeled yarn from Glasgow to India and Singapore.104 
The preceding discussion has indicated that the legal infrastructure devised by 
national governments was only partly successful in addressing the concerns of the MCC: 
the standard hank of 840 yards remained elusive to  monitor or enforce. Merchants were 
compelled to adopt a different strategy, that of convincing Lancashire spinning firms to 
adopt this standard and to agree on rules to enforce it. At stake was not just an issue of 
eliminating false description. A deeper, more fundamental issue was whether parties to a 
contract could reliably establish that a breach of contract had occurred if a hank contained 
less than 840 yards. 
UNIFORM CONTRACTING AND TESTING FOR QUALITY 
By the early 1890s, merchants were keen to regulate the trading of yarn in Manchester by 
introducing uniform contracting rules; the MCC promulgated these in December 1896.105 
As may be expected, the contract addressed a range of issues affecting the terms of 
exchange, including: strikes, lockouts, and compensation when a delivery of yarn was 
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rejected because of concerns about its ‘quality’.106 For our purposes, the key provisions 
of the uniform contract were: ‘The number of hanks in a bundle, taking 840 yards to the 
hank, must indicate the counts of the yarns’ (Article 4); ‘In case of dispute as to counts, 
length, weight or condition, the yarn shall be tested by and according to the rules of the 
Manchester Testing House, and its certificates shall be binding on both parties’ (Article 
5); and ‘In case of dispute the decision whether a delivery may or may not be rejected, 
and what damages shall be paid for breach of contract, shall be left to the Tribunal of 
Arbitration’ (Rule 14).107 
Here, the interests of some of the spinning firms coincided with the merchants. 
The Federation of Master Cotton Spinners Association (FMCSA) in fact collaborated with 
the MCC to introduce the uniform contract rules in 1895. 108  Spinning firms had 
recognised the need to remedy the ‘laxity of the present system of contracts for the sale 
and purchase of yarn.’ This was especially the case with Oldham spinners, who depended 
more upon yarn exports than other regions such as Bolton. 109  The FMCSA had 
unsuccessfully tried to introduce a standard ‘basis of contract’ between 1893 and 1894. 
Oldham firms reckoned that successful standardisation of contracts required ‘an 
agreement [between] not only spinners, but also manufacturers, merchants, and others 
interested in the subject.’110 However, the cotton strike in the 1890s had forced this topic 
to the background.  
Meanwhile, the MCC initiated its own campaign to develop such a contract which 
was, ‘acceptable to buyers and sellers, [that it] should be framed and recommended for 
general use in the home and foreign yarn trade’.111 Determining the wording and content 
of the contract required that the MCC collaborate with representatives of the major 
employers’ associations to achieve consensus on the length of yarn in a hank, the 
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contingencies which might lead to breach of contract and the establishment of an impartial 
and authoritative means to resolve disputes.112  
The introduction of the uniform contract was a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for regulating the Lancashire yarn trade: the establishment of a Testing House 
was the other key component because it provided impartial and authoritative tests of 
disputed yarn quality. In addition, as we discuss below, the Testing House became 
increasingly involved in the testing of cloth, a crucial feature as  exports of this product 
grew rapidly after 1900.  
Initially, there was considerable opposition to the Testing House. William 
Tattersall (FMCSA) claimed there was ‘no desire expressed for such a house’, and that 
there would be considerable difficulties in its operation.113 Nonetheless, the MCC was 
adamant that an independent facility for verifying the accuracy of statements about length 
and weight of textiles was vital: 
The Yarn Sectional Committee is of opinion that arbitration cannot 
be satisfactorily carried out without accurate and impartial 
authority for the testing of raw materials, yarns and textiles.  [We] 
take the necessary steps for the establishment of a Testing Room114 
 The Testing House was established in 1895 in collaboration with Manchester City 
Council. Individual members of MCC agreed to contribute £25 to cover any deficit that 
might be incurred by the establishment of this facility.115 A manager was appointed for 
the new facility and The Manchester Guardian was soon reporting that the activities of 
the Testing House ‘fully justify the action of the Chamber of Commerce in undertaking 
this new and important branch of work.’116  
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The activities of the Testing House increased rapidly: the number of samples 
submitted for testing nearly quadrupled in the decade preceding the First World War (see 
Table 2). Alfred Rée, the chairman of the Testing House, claimed in 1932, ‘Originally 
instituted as a convenience for local firms [samples are now sent to the Testing House] 
not only from firms in Lancashire but from many parts of the world’.117  The number of 
samples tested by the Testing House had increased to more than 27,000 per annum in 
1930, up from about 2,700 in 1900. Based on these tests, the institution would issue 
‘statements of opinion’ certifying the relative quality of samples of yarn or cloth, the 
causes of defects arising in manufacture, and whether disputed goods constituted fair 
marketable standards.118 It was, at the time, an almost  unique institution: the linen-testing 
house in Belfast and the wool-testing house in Bradford, although older, were much 
smaller in comparison.119 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Testing House rules required samples to be supplied for analysis: a minimum of 
one pound (weight) for moisture and count tests. Certificates issued by the Testing House 
referred only to the samples submitted and not the bulk from which they were taken.120 
For bundle yarns, testing to determine the moisture in a sample required comparison of 
the total moisture in the sample to its ‘absolutely dry weight’. Other tests compared the 
count determined ‘in condition received’, without correction for moisture, with the ‘count 
in correct condition’ once appropriate allowance had been made for moisture. In some 
cases, the Testing House was unable to provide an exact analysis of count. For example, 
it was difficult to state with exact accuracy the count of grey yarn prior to dyeing or 
bleaching. Tests could also authoritatively determine the count of yarn after it had been 
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woven into cloth – a crucial test if weavers doubted the counts indicated on their yarn 
purchases. 121 
The ‘scientific basis’ of the Testing House rules reflected the increasing use of 
more sophisticated and systematic sampling techniques for ascertaining quality 
measurements in British industry.122 The centralization of such measurements with the 
Testing House, on the basis of which quality certificates were issued, limited the extent of 
measurements required to adjudicate disputes. It eliminated duplicative measurements, 
and projected an aura of scientific testing in resolving disputes regarding quality 
standards. Importantly, the rulings of the Testing House were legally enforceable in the 
Courts, as we show in the following section.  
THE LEGACY OF MERCHANT INTERVENTION 
The legacy of merchant intervention is best understood as an attempt at quality control 
within the supply chain. The Testing House and uniform contract established centralised 
facilities for the testing of quality. Although within a couple of decades other rival testing 
facilities would emerge to compete with the MCC’s Testing House, the notion of 
centralised testing was definitively established within this industry. Concomitantly, the 
legality of the uniform contract was unequivocally established, both within the arbitration 
proceedings of the MCC as well as the broader legal framework. The standards that the 
merchants sought to impose were upheld in the few, albeit landmark, legal cases that were 
decided following the introduction of the uniform contract in 1897.  Further, the ‘internal’ 
arbitration of disputes involving quality became more firmly established in this period.123 
The role of merchants in controlling this arbitration process remained contentious even in 
the early decades of the twentieth century. Such differences brought into sharper focus the 
question of who was ultimately responsible for the control of quality of the manufactured 
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product – the producers who spun the yarn or weaved the cloth or the merchants who 
owned the trade marks which were applied to these products? The producers had begun 
asserting a greater control over quality, especially towards the end of our period, through 
research on cotton fibres (inputs) and on processes. Even so, the influence of merchants 
on what constituted marketable quality remained substantial, especially in export markets. 
Ultimately, notions of quality, standards to enforce it, and its control along the supply 
chain, had to be reconstituted or re-evaluated as the textile industry experienced structural 
shifts: exports of cloth became significantly more important as compared to yarn between 
1895 and 1914. We examine these issues below. 
The uniform contract received a mixed response from spinners: Oldham firms 
adopted them enthusiastically, as did the FMCSA. However, other spinners associations 
did not support the uniform contract rules. Burnley argued that its members would insist 
on ‘full and regular counts’ without the assistance of uniform contracts; ‘every spinner 
and buyer could ignore the contract form and make any contract they chose.’124 Bolton 
thought the sheer diversity of markets to which its yarns were sent would render a uniform 
contract worthless, as well as unnecessarily causing friction between buyer and seller.125 
The Blackburn Chamber of Commerce and the North and North East Lancashire Cotton 
Spinners’ Associations also declined to adopt uniform contracts.126 The likely proportion 
of yarn covered by uniform contracts in this period was about 40 per cent, being the 
proportion of spindles or spinning capacity covered by FMCSA and OSMCA.127 
Nonetheless, there was a rapid growth in centralised testing between 1899128 and 
1914: samples of yarns and textiles tested increased by threefold, whereas revenues from 
testing increased more than tenfold (Table 2). Textile samples accounted for over 80 per 
cent of the Testing House’s total activity. Testing of yarn amounted to between one-fifth 
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and one-third of all samples tested. In fact, the high demand for the testing of cloth, in 
addition to the demand for yarn testing, surprised the MCC.129  
It is apparent from Tables 1 and 2 that the growth in the activities of the Testing 
House were closely aligned to the industry’s international expansion in this period. This 
can be illustrated through the problem of maximum permissible standards of moisture 
(regain) in textiles. The International Congress for the Establishment of Uniform System 
of Numbering Yarn held at Turin, 1875, was the first to attempt to fix moisture standards 
for international trade in yarn. The 1875 congress specified that the maximum ‘regain’ on 
cotton textiles was 8.5 %.  However, Manchester merchants did not accept this standard. 
Determining the true regain for yarn was problematic for a variety of reasons. The first 
issue was that the regain of 8.5 % was misleading – it only applied if the yarn was 
‘absolutely dry’. In addition, this regain was calculated using an ‘average condition of the 
air’, but in spinning mills, the amount of moisture varied between 3.5 and 7.5%.130 In 
these circumstances, the MCC  considered it impossible to set a ‘true’ standard, and 
consequently the activities of the Testing House were crucial to adjudicating on these 
differences.  
Notwithstanding partial acceptance of the uniform contracting rules, the MCC 
could settle disputes involving quality of yarn or cloth on the basis of its testing facilities, 
particularly since its tribunal was a ‘properly constituted court’ under the Arbitration Act 
of 1889.131 In addition, the voluntary nature of the uniform contract did not prevent such 
contracts from being legally enforceable in arbitration or courts of law. The case of 
Atkinson & Co., v. Emmott, both parties transacting on the Manchester Royal Exchange, 
is illustrative here. After a contract was signed the market price of yarn declined and the 
defendant refused to take delivery of the yarn. As the terms of the contract were governed 
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by the uniform contract rules, as stated in the contract, judgement was entered in favour 
of the plaintiffs. In Pearl Mill Co v. Smith & Forrest (1907), Judge Bradbury stated, ‘The 
practical effect [of the case] on the evidence before him, was to fix on spinners the 
standard of moisture fixed by the Manchester Testing-house… and if spinners desired to 
depart from [the standard] they must do so in their written contracts’.132 The directors of 
the MCC received this judgement with considerable satisfaction.133  
The activities of the Testing House and the Tribunal of Arbitration were not 
immune from criticism. A Manchester textile agent had claimed in 1905 that, ‘nobody in 
Manchester would take any notice of a Testing House Report; that the place consisted of 
a parcel of boys; and that the Testing House could not test correctly, or within 20%’.134   
Similarly, an anonymous letter, penned under the pseudonym ‘Merchant’ was published 
in the Manchester Guardian specifically criticising the competence of the Testing House 
to determine the true count of yarn from cloth samples: ‘I think it is nothing short of a 
public scandal that after an existence of fifteen years they have not yet discovered a 
reliable method of obtaining the counts of yarn in cloth’. 135  In the latter case, the 
complainant, Charles Duckworth, agreed to participate in a further trial in which the count 
of yarn would be determined prior to and after weaving. Three types of cloth were 
analysed and it was reported that the average difference between the count prior to 
weaving and after its conversion into cloth, was just 1.6 per cent. The MCC reported that, 
‘no further action be taken, as the above mentioned test confirmed the reliability of the 
system of testing’. 136  Prior to 1914, we can find only one other reported complaint 
involving the determination of yarn counts from cloth and the MCC was able to firmly 
rebuke the complaint because all yarns had slight natural variation.137  
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The Tribunal, which was set up as a ‘merchant’s court’, also attracted some 
measure of criticism. With ‘merchants acting as judges’, some considered it a ‘dangerous 
experiment’ to exclude legal assistance to parties involved in the dispute.138 The absence 
of legal representation was not strictly true as the MCC claimed that solicitors were 
allowed presence at Tribunal hearings. The real issue was the secrecy surrounding the 
proceedings of the Tribunal. A member of the MCC complained that even ‘ordinary 
information such as the number and nature of disputes and names of arbitrators, which 
should be on records of the Chamber is denied to its members.’139  The MCC responded 
to this complaint by stating that ‘it would defeat the object for which the Tribunal of 
Arbitration was formed if greater publicity were given to the proceedings.’140 
Testing House reports formed a crucial part of the Tribunal’s (and the MCC’s) 
efforts to minimise disputes arising from short reeling. When Elijah Helm wrote to the 
Bombay Chamber of Commerce about a sample of 20s count that turned out to be counts 
of  17.9s, he enclosed the Testing House ‘certificate of examination’ as evidence. The test 
showed that the samples had lengths of 720 yards, 743 yards, 681 yards and 712 yards, 
rather than the hank of 840 yards.141 In 1910, the Tribunal claimed that as ‘usual, the most 
frequent class of cases [were those with] questions [regarding] whether goods supplied 
are or are not in accordance with the contract of sale, and whether they are to be rejected 
or accepted, with or without an allowance.’142 Other representative results from reports 
issued by the Testing House are shown in Table 3. Even though by 1914, the Tribunal 
reported there were ‘fewer cases in which quality of condition of goods sold came into 
question’, this was more a reflection of the decline in the disputes referred to the Tribunal 
for that year.143 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
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Overall, apart from some specific (and isolated) complaints involving the 
assessment of yarn counts in cloth, the activities of the Testing House were favourably 
received. The Times reported in 1913 that this institution had, ‘admirably served the needs 
of the industry on the practical side’, and it acknowledged the ‘cutting-edge’ analysis of 
the Testing House in determining yarn counts from cloth. 144 The MCC reported that 
cotton manufacturers were intending to establish a similar facility in Boston, USA.145 
American manufacturers claimed that ‘analysis of testing of textile fibres is rapidly 
becoming more necessary’ cited the activities of the Manchester Testing House as an 
example of ‘advances in scientific examination’.146 It is also apparent that certificates 
issued by the Testing House attesting to the particular attributes of samples were deployed 
in the advertising strategies of firms (Figure 1). This practice was not condoned by the 
MCC because it could undermine its impartiality, but it had no legal powers to prevent 
such advertisements.147 
[FIGURE 1 TO GO HERE] 
 
The yarn spinners and other manufacturers had an uneasy relationship with the 
merchants on the issue of uniform contracting and the Testing House facilities. In 1916, 
when the wartime government approached the Lancashire manufacturers with a proposal 
to set-up a research and testing facility independent of the MCC, many prominent 
manufacturers such as J W McConnel, H P Greg, W Lawrence Balls, and  Kenneth Lee, 
supported this initiative. The discussions  culminated in  the establishment of the British 
Cotton Industry Research Association (BCRI) in 1919, rechristened shortly thereafter as 
the Shirley Institute. It offered yarn-testing facilities to rival those of the MCC’s Testing 
House.148 This development was of great concern to the merchants and in later years the 
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MCC reported that the work of the Shirley Institute ‘was affecting the progress and 
position of the Testing House’, and that it needed to ‘watch with care any developments 
which might prove detrimental to the progress and position of the Testing House’.149 Even 
though this competing facility set up by the manufacturers was some years in the future, 
the MCC had recognised this threat as early as 1907. The Testing House report for 1906 
stated that the decrease in the number of yarn tests was because ‘certain firms have found 
it worthwhile to establish their own testing departments, and thus to withdraw some of 
their support from the Testing House.’150 Greg and Co, had a well established testing room 
by the 1920s, wherein they would conduct their own tests on yarn bought from specialised 
spinning firms – a legacy of their decision to discontinue spinning their own yarn in 
1894.151 
CONCLUSIONS  
The case of merchant intervention in the Lancashire textile industry has broader 
significance beyond contributing to the considerable literature on this industry. This 
significance relates to how historians should study standards, law, institutions and 
historical markets. Philip Scranton and Patrick Fridenson have stressed the importance to 
business historians of investigating standards in which we not only glimpse the agency of 
historical actors, but also the outcome of contending interests at play152. This article has 
examined the efforts of Manchester merchants to enforce their standards along the supply 
chain to regulate what they considered to be the nefarious practice of short-measurements 
in yarn and cloth products. That they were only partially successful in our period does not 
diminish the significance of their influence on the textile industry. Through 
standardisation they sought to control product quality in an industry that had already 
gained a reputation for extreme product specialisation. Merchant intervention acted as an 
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integrating influence within an industry made of disintegrated modes of production and 
distribution: Gibbon terms this as ‘loosely filamented relationships lacking integration and 
hierarchy. 153 Our case study demonstrates how such ‘merchant-driven’ supply chains 
were historically able to enforce quality standards, which, although challenging, were 
achievable without vertical integration. Existing historical studies have hitherto explored 
such issues in primary products. We contribute to the literature by exposing how this was 
true in important manufacturing sectors, such as textiles, as well. 
Significantly, the article brings into focus the issue of how conflicting interests 
shape the standards and notions of quality that eventually dominate an industrial sector. 
The state-of-the-art understanding of standard recognises that standardisation is a political 
process.154 Our case study especially highlights how the competition for control of the 
supply chains was an integral aspect of establishing standards. 155  Disentangling the 
standardisation process requires  closer attention to competing interests vying for control 
of the supply chain: competition not just between firms in an horizontal relationship, but 
between firms in a vertical relationship within supply chains. In our case study, merchants 
invested considerable resources in imposing standards as it gave them control over 
product quality. Simultaneously, manufacturers attempted to retain flexibility in 
production – and thereby control over quality – by not enforcing too rigid a standard for 
yarn or cloth length. At stake was the choice between a restrictive but easy to monitor 
‘one-size-fits-all’ standard that potentially stifled innovation, or multiple ‘competing’ 
standards that potentially increased the costs of monitoring and compliance, but provided 
manufacturers with the flexibility required in a highly competitive environment. The 
Lancashire textile industry grappled with such issues during the latter half of the 
nineteenth century.156 This issue was substantially, but not conclusively, resolved by the 
end of our period. 
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The article further highlights the institutional conflicts surrounding 
standardisation. Standards exhibit characteristics of public goods, which does not preclude 
their origins as privately set standards; conversely, the adoption of publicly set standards 
need not imply mandatory compliance.157 Are privately set but compulsory standards 
more effective in controlling product quality compared to standards that are publicly set, 
but whose adoption is voluntary and depends upon customs prevalent within the trade? 
Merchants grappled with these issues throughout the period we study. Differences in 
accepted norms within the trade generated discord between  textile firms in terms of what 
constituted illegal deviation from product standards. This is evidenced by the conflict 
between Manchester merchants and producer firms from Lancashire, Glasgow and 
elsewhere in Europe and India. Such conflicting notions of acceptable (or de facto) 
standards show the limitations of national statutes to resolve the specific problems 
affecting the yarn trade. The national and international legislative environment governing 
misleading trade descriptions was insufficient in maintaining confidence in market 
transactions. The fundamental disjuncture between legislation and accepted trade use of 
terms was an important reason for this. The problems of obtaining sufficient evidence to 
satisfy the specific requirements of the Merchandise Marks Act of 1887, meant 
prosecutions were limited. Charles Bailey, who was employed by Ralli Brothers, claimed 
that the nominal damages awarded in successful litigation deterred many from instituting 
legal action. 158  As we have shown, such instances exposed the limitations of state 
legislation. 
Merchant intervention in the form of uniform contracts and centralised testing 
facilities, aided the arbitration of disputes and  mitigated the limitations of state legislation. 
This system effectively introduced a ‘private legal system’ that allowed the merchants to 
‘internalise’ the governance and control of product quality.159 The emergence of such a 
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quasi-legal system was not unique to the trade in textile manufactures, but it was very 
unusual for a manufactured commodity – usually these institutions are evident in markets 
involving primary commodities in this period. Our contribution to the state-of-the-art is 
to substantially highlight the significance of such private legal systems in Britain, and the 
manner in which such institutions operated at the boundary of civic and state society. 
Study of such institutions will allow historians to further develop a more nuanced and 
grounded understanding of commercial and economic institutions, rather than the binary 
of ‘absence or presence’ of legal institutions to promote governance. 
This article additionally addresses more fundamental questions about the evolution 
of capitalism and market governance during the Victorian period. Paul Johnson has argued 
that, ‘the ways in which market structures were constructed in Victorian Britain is only 
indistinctly glimpsed in the literature’.160 He further stresses that economists have tended 
to reify and simplify the market, assuming away the contestable and conditional nature of 
economic exchange. For example, the transaction-cost view describing market exchanges 
relegates the issue of quality, standardisation, and contract enforcement to ‘market-based 
governance’: that is, repeated transactions in a competitive setting.161 Historians, too, have 
largely ignored the institutional processes by which market structures were created in 
nineteenth-century Britain.162 The lack of both economic and historical understanding of 
markets as social spaces where groups with diverse interests contend with each other to 
specify the rules of exchange has resulted in a lopsided understanding of how market 
governance functioned. 
In this article, we have responded to Paul Johnson’s call to pay greater attention to 
the institutional process through which rules of market exchange develop. We glimpse the 
conditional and contestable nature of market exchange and how rival groups sought more 
 38 
direct means to govern it. We see how they attempted to develop solutions to transactional 
issues – standardising product quality - internally within the industry and overcome the 
limitations of state legislation (e.g. Merchandise Marks Acts). However, competition was 
also accompanied by cooperation between firms who fiercely competed for markets and 
resources: competition and cooperation are two sides of the same industrial coin.  
Competition threatened quality debasement which necessitated some degree of 
cooperation on quality standards.  As Robin Pearson has noted, in commercial relations 
trust has to be laboriously constructed even if it is innately present in the culture of 
contracting parties or where a legal framework exists to encourage it.163 People rely not 
only upon a general concept of trust and reputation, but also in specific dealings with other 
individuals. 164  In other words, market governance is based not only on general 
institutional arrangements (e.g. standards, legislation), but also on specific organisational 
arrangements (e.g. quality testing, dispute resolution mechanisms) that characterise an 
industry. In the Lancashire industry, generic notions of trust, reputation, and repeated 
interaction could no longer achieve governance. Redford shows how merchants claimed 
that methods to ‘shame the fraudulent’ largely remained unsuccessful after c1860.165 
Institutions, such as the MCC, dealt not only with strategic manipulations by dishonest 
firms, but also honest disputes that arose in the course of exchange. Such institutions were 
key organisational forms in an industry where the ‘visible hand’ of vertically integrated 
organisations accounted for a small percentage of capacity. They were ‘gap-filling’ in a 
highly specialized industry, just as business groups or integrated firms were when markets 
were thin.166 Many nineteenth-century firms in Lancashire spun yarns, while some others 
‘spun a yarn’. The market functioned because this industry was able to agree on standards 
and institutions to overcome the weaknesses of market-based exchange that state 
legislation could not.  
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Table 2. Manchester Testing House: Samples tested, 1899-1913 
 
 
Note: Total samples refers to the sum of yarn, textiles, chemicals and produce. 
 
Source: Calculated from GMRCO MCC, M8/4/28, Testing House Management Committee Reports, 1899-1919. 
 
  
  
Year 
  
Fees Received 
(£) 
Samples Tested (Nos.)   
Yarn+Textiles 
(% of Total) Yarn Textiles 
Total 
samples 
1899  501.22  1525 1966 4257 82.0% 
1900  739.82  642 1446 2781 75.1% 
1901  1,002.85  1253 1714 3802 78.0% 
1902  1,000.30  1084 1394 3388 73.1% 
1903  1,167.27  1213 1549 3794 72.8% 
1904  1,413.43  1601 3333 6001 82.2% 
1905  2,935.78  1529 5236 7976 84.8% 
1906  1,703.18  1377 2348 4657 80.0% 
1907  1,661.20  1774 2729 5505 81.8% 
1908  2,080.58  2210 3531 7059 81.3% 
1909  2,426.45  3144 3848 7244 96.5% 
1910  2,269.25  1948 3834 7229 80.0% 
1911  2,236.55  2334 4435 8132 83.2% 
1912  2,470.25  2621 4294 7614 90.8% 
1913  4,320.68  2417 7353 11788 82.9% 
1914  6,320.82  3215 9533 14824 86.0% 
Table 2. Yarn and cloth exports by volume, 1880-1913. 
           
 
 
Average Annual Volume of exports Yarn exports as  % 
total textile exports 
 
Yarn Piece Goods/Cloth 
1880-89 250.39 833.17 23.3 
1890-99 239.02 923.04 20.6 
1900-1909 189.26 1030.95 15.4 
1910-1913 217.40 1216.45 15.2 
1880-1913  225.18 962.86 19.2 
            
Notes: 
1. Volume denotes pound weight (millions). 
2. Values in columns two, three, and four refer to annual averages. 
3. Robson assumes an average weight of 5.5 yards per lb. for piece goods/cloth 
 
Source: Robson, Cotton Industry, p331 Statistics (A), Table 1 
 
 Table 3 Examples of cases investigated by the Testing House  
                    
 
Date Merchant1 Spinner Yarn type2 Reported count Actual count Shortfall (%)3 
       
 1897 Messrs Hiltermann Bros; n.a. Dyed 40s 31.93s 34.1 
 George Fraser, Son & Co.   40s 38.88s 32.5 
       
1898 n.a n.a. (Glasgow) Dyed n.a. n.a. 32.1 
    n.a n.a. 49.2 
       
1898 Messrs. S & C Nordlinger John Orr Ewing Dyed n.a.  n.a. 33.6 
    n.a. n.a. 32.8 
       
1902 George Fraser, Son & Co. n.a. (Bombay) Grey 40s 37.9s 2.3 
   Grey 40s 39.7s 0.36 
   Grey 40s 38.6s 3.5 
   Grey  10s 9.9s 3.0 
       
 
Notes. 1. Column two refers to the merchants who reported the fraud. 
 2. As discussed in the text, the ‘standard’ hank for grey yarns was 840 yards; the maximum permissible ‘shrinkage’ for dyed yarns was 
2.5% of 840 yards, which equates to 819 yards.  
 3. Shortfall is expressed as the percentage difference between reported and actual length, in yards.  In some cases the actual length of 
yarn (not count), is reported. 
 
Sources: GMCRO, MCC, M8/4/32, Minutes of the Yarn Section, 5 July, 1897;  GMCRO, MCC, M8/4/34, Minutes of the Yarn Conference held 
at Carlisle, 9 March, 1898 (letter dated 25 April, 1899); GMCRO, MCC, M8/4/32, Minutes of the Yarn Section, 4 April, 1898; 4 May, 1898; 
GMCRO, MCC, M8/4/28, Testing House Management Committee, Joint Meeting of the Yarn and Testing House Sections, 26 February, 1902.  
 
